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Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial claims that there are no material questions of fact which 
would preclude summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the questions of fact which 
existed were not material because a check is not a sufficient note or memorandum of a guaranty 
agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and no original obligation was created to take the 
transaction out ofthe Statute of Frauds because there was no new and beneficial consideration 
flowing to Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. Setting aside all the complicated nuances of the law 
on guarantees and original obligations, can a business person like Horrocks write a check to 
another business person for $34,980 and expect to escape liability for it as a matter of law? Are 
the facts and law so clear on this issue that Mickelsen Construction is denied the right to a trial? 
The trial court accepted as true for purposes of the motion for summary judgment that 
Horrocks agreed to guarantee the Accelerated debt. Horrocks' version of what happened 
differed from that of Mickelsen. Horrocks' version was most consistent with her having created 
an original obligation which was corroborated by her giving Mickelsen a check for $34,980. 
Mickelsen's version was most consistent with Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial having guaranteed 
the Accelerated debt. Yet, despite these acknowledged material and disputed facts, Mickelsen 
Construction's case was dismissed. How can Mickelsen Construction have no remedy against 
someone who gave it a bad check for $34,980? Such a result is not logical. 
REPL Y BRlEF - PAGE 1 
A. THE CHECK WAS AN ADEQUATE WRITING TO SATISFY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS 
At page 6 of Respondent's Brief, Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial criticizes Mickelsen 
Construction's reliance on Illustration 1 17 to Restatement 2d of Contracts, § 131 ~ and suggests that 
Illustration 18 is more pertinent to this case. Both 17 and 18 are Illustrations to Conmlent h which 
provides as follows: 
h. Statement of consideration. In Wain v. Warlters, 5 East 10 (K.B. 1804), a promise 
in writing to pay the debt of another was held unenforceable because the writing 
failed to state the consideration, which had been fully executed. Where that view is 
followed, the words "for value received" or an implication of consideration may 
validate the memorandum. But the decision has not been generally followed in the 
United States, and the English law was changed by statute in 1856. Uniform 
Commercial Code § 3-408 eliminates the requirement of consideration for a 
negotiable instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or as security for an 
antecedent obligation, and § 3-416 exempts from the Statute of Frauds any guaranty 
written on a negotiable instrument. Aside from explicit statutory provisions, the 
prevailing view is that error or omission in the recital of past events does not affect 
the sufficiency of a memorandum. 
Where, on the other hand, the consideration for a promise consists of a return 
promise not yet performed, performance of the return promise is commonly a 
condition of the promisor's duty, and an adequate memorandum will ordinarily reveal 
the consideration. A memorandum of a contract for the sale of land for an agreed 
price is not sufficient unless it discloses the price. Compare Uniform Commercial 
Code §§ 1-206 and 3-319, referring to "a defined or stated price" for intangible 
personal property or for investment securities. But § 2-201 dispenses with statement 
of the price of goods sold. (Emphasis supplied) 
Restat 2d of Contracts, § 131 
1 Appellant erroneously referred to "17" as a "Comment" in Appellant's Brief when it 
should have been referred to as an "Illustration" to "Comment h." This error in nomenclature is 
corrected in this Reply Brief. 
2 Appellant's Brief at page 18 
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Mickelsen Construction agreed to forego filing a lien on Accelerated's project and never did 
file a lien on the project. (R., p. 48) However, the non-filing of the lien was a "past event" by the 
time the Check was written. According to Comment h "omission in the recital of past events does 
not affect the sufficiency of a memorandum." 18 is an Illustration of a "return promise not yet 
performed" (i.e. an agreement not to sue on past and future deliveries where A still had the ability 
to file suit when the guaranty was made). Illustration 17 is the Illustration which is most similar to 
the facts in this case. Non-filing the lien was a past event which need not be recited in the 
memorandum. The Check is a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial criticizes what it calls Mickelsen Construction's failure "to 
address the District Court's quotation of American Jurisprudence Guaranty.,,3 The cited section of 
the treatise simply requires the memorandum (i.e. "instrument") to show with reasonable clarity (1) 
an intent to be liable on an obligation in case of default by the primary obligor and (2) the express 
conditions of that liability and the obligations of each party. Mickelsen Construction did address the 
adequacy of the Check as a memorandum of the agreement throughout Subsection "B" of 
Appellant's Brief. The Check was signed by Horrocks; was dated January 8, 2009; identified 
Accelerated; was made payable to Mickelsen Construction; and was for the exact amount to be 
guaranteed. Horrocks signed a check for $34,980 which was payable to Mickelsen Construction 
and delivered it to Mickelsen Construction. This shows with reasonable clarity that Horrocks 
intended to be liable on Accelerated's obligation in case of default by Accelerated. The check was 
dated January 8, 2009, was signed and was delivered to Mickelsen Construction. This shows with 
3Respondent's Brief at page 7 
4Appellant's Brief at pages 13 - 18 
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reasonable clarity that Horrocks was immediately liable to Mickelsen Construction for the amount 
of Accelerated's debt. In other words, because of the way that Horrocks 'wrote and delivered the 
check she eliminated any conditions. The check could have been cashed that day. The Check is a 
sufficient memorandum to satisfY the Statute of Frauds. 
The trial court was wrong when it concluded that the Check lacked the essential elements of 
a contract because it failed to "set forth parties to the contract, the subject matter thereof, the price 
or consideration,. . . and all the essential terms and conditions of the agreement." (Respondent's 
Brief at page 7; R at p. 71) The parties to the contract were Mickelsen Construction and 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. The subject matter was "$34,980" which was the amount of the 
check. Because Mickelsen Construction's promise to forego filing a lien was a "past event" it was 
not necessary to recite it in the memorandum. Restatement 2d of Contracts, § 131 5• The Check was 
dated which made it enforceable as of the date of the check. A guarantee is an undertaking or 
promise on the part ofthe guarantor which is collateral to a primary or principal obligation and binds 
the guarantor to performance in the event of non-performance of the principal obligor. The Check 
bound Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial to pay Mickelsen Construction $34,980. It was a sufficient 
5See Comment Q to Restatement 3d of Suretyship & Guaranty, § 9: Q. The requirement of 
consideration. Generally speaking, the secondary obligation, as a contract, must be supported by 
consideration. Typically, the consideration supporting the underlying obligation will also support 
the secondary obligation and no separate consideration is necessary. Often, though, the secondary 
obligation is supported by consideration separate from that supporting the underlying obligation. 
III ustrati ons: 
1. C agrees to lend D $1,000 if S will guarantee D's obligation to C. Following S's 
execution of a written guaranty, C makes the loan. S's guaranty is supported by 
consideration even though S receives no direct benefit from the loan. 
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note or memorandum ofthe agreement by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial to guarantee Accelerated's 
obligation. 
B. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CREATE A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO 
WHETHER HORROCKS/SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL BECAME THE ORIGINAL 
OBLIGOR 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial argues that the cases cited by the trial court are binding 
precedent. (Respondent's Brief, p. 8) However, the trial court recognized that no Idaho case is 
completely similar to this case. (R., p. 65) Thus, the trial court was not slavishly bound to apply 
the precedents without regard to the facts. The result must be dependent upon the facts and the facts 
in this case were disputed which should have precluded summary judgment. 
There were two different versions of the transaction. (Compare Mickelsen's version, R., pp. 
47 - 50 to Horrocks version, R., pp. 22 - 24) It was Horrocks' version that created the question of 
fact about Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial being an original obligor. It was Horrocks who decided 
to route the credit card transaction through the Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial bank account to fund 
the check Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial gave to Mickelsen Construction. (R., pp. 22 - 24) 
Although Horrocks claims Mickelsen Construction agreed to hold the check until American Express 
funded the credit card transaction, it was Horrocks who dated the check the same day it was 
delivered to Mickelsen Construction thereby eliminating any condition precedent to cashing it. (R., 
p. 23) Believing she had confirmed that American Express was going to fund the credit card 
transaction, Horrocks gave Mickelsen Construction the signed and dated check for $34,980, making 
it immediately negotiable. (R., p. 23) She was now the original obligor. 
The trial court recognized that 1. C. §9-506(l), (2) and (3) were implicated by the facts of this 
case. (R., p. 65) Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to accept the credit card transaction from 
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Accelerated and promised to apply it to the debt to Mickelsen Construction thereby implicating 1. 
e. §9-506(l). Mickelsen Construction parted with value, its agreement not to lien the project of 
Accelerated, and Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to facilitate the transaction making 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial the primary debtor thereby implicating 1. C. §9-506(2). Mickelsen 
Construction released Accelerated from its right to lien the project and accepted Horrocks/Sunshine 
Secretarial's check in exchange thereby implicating 1. e. §9-506(3). Instead of finding that these 
facts created questions offact which precluded summary judgment, the trial court applied the "main 
purpose" rule and held that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial was not the original obligor because no 
consideration flowed directly to Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. 
Mickelsen Construction does not dispute that where the "main purpose" rule is satisfied, (i.e. 
where new and beneficial consideration flows to the obligor) the agreement is outside the Statute of 
Frauds. However, the trial court concluded that even where 1. C. §9-506(l) or (2) or (3) are 
satisfied, the "main purpose" rule must also be satisfied to create an original obligation which is 
outside the Statute of Frauds. (R., pp. 65 - 68) Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial argues in support of 
the trial court's conclusion that the decision in Reed v. Samuels, 43 Idaho 55 (1926) requires new 
and beneficial consideration flowing to the obligor to create an original obligation within the 
provisions of 1. C. §9-506(1) or (2) or (3). (Respondent's Brief, pp. 9 - 10) That is, however, a 
misreading of Reed, or an extension of its holding, because the Court stated that the appellants in that 
casefailedto bring "themselves within either of the foregoing statutory exceptions6 quoted." Reed, 
43 Idaho at 61. After recognizing that the facts ofthe case were not within the statutory exceptions, 
6Referring to C. S., sec. 7977(2) and (3) which were the predecessors to 1. C. §9-506(2) 
and (3) 
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the Court in Reed analyzed whether there was any new and beneficial consideration which flowed 
to the obligor to support the claim that this was a case involving an original obligation. Finding 
none, the Court held that the Statute of Frauds applied. 
The trial court in this case erred when it concluded that because the "main purpose" rule was 
not satisfied there was no need to analyze whether 1. C. §9-506(1) or (2) or (3) took the transaction 
outside the Statute of Frauds. (R., p. 68) Mickelsen Construction acknowledges that 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial did not receive money from American Express, but it was not because 
of anything Mickelsen Construction did or failed to do. Horrocks did her own due diligence and 
satisfied herself that the money would be there before she wrote the check to Mickelsen 
Construction. Material questions of fact exist as to whether 1. C. §9-506(1) applies and takes the 
transaction outside the Statute of Frauds. Neither the trial court nor Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial 
seriously dispute whether the provisions of 1. C. §9-506(2) are met. Mickelsen Construction parted 
with value - it did not lien the project - and the circumstances were such as to make 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial the principal debtor- Horrocks gave Mickelsen Construction a check 
for the amount thereby directly obligating Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial to Mickelsen Construction. 
Mickelsen Construction acknowledges that Accelerated's obligation to it was not cancelled, but not 
because of anything Mickelsen Construction did or failed to do. Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial 
failed to fund the check thereby breaching the agreement to pay. However, because Mickelsen did 
not lien the project and accepted the Check the provisions of 1. C. §9-506(3) are met, or at least 
material questions of fact exist to preclude summary judgment. 
The facts create genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment on the 
question whether by giving the check to Mickelsen Construction, Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial 
created an original obligation which was outside the Statute of Frauds. 
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C. THE TRlAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED FINAL JUDGMENT PRECLUDING 
LITIGATION OF WHETHER THE CHECK IS AN ENFORCEABLE NEGOTIABLE 
INSTRUMENT 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial is correct that Mickelsen Construction did not raise before the 
trial court on summary judgment the argument that the check was independently enforceable as a 
negotiable instrument. That was not the issue on summary judgment. The only issue on summary 
judgment was whether the transaction was govemed by the Statute of Frauds and, if so, whether the 
check was a sufficient note or memorandum of the guaranty transaction to satisfY the Statute of 
Frauds contained in I. C. §9-505. The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court was correct 
in entering a final judgment dismissing the claims of Mickelsen Construction. (R., p. 74) Mickelsen 
Construction maintains that even if its claim that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial guaranteed the 
transaction fails, it should still be able to try to collect the amount of the check and the trial court 
should not have entered a final judgment after ruling on the motion for summary judgment directed 
at whether the Check could be enforced as a guaranty. Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure a judgment should only be entered "upon a decision by the court . . . that all relief 
shall be denied." IRCP 58(a) "A judgment is final if . . . judgment has been entered on all 
claims for relief." IRCP 54(a) When the trial court entered judgment in this case it foreclosed 
Mickelsen Construction from pursuing recovery from Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial for the amount 
of the Check which bounced. The trial court erred in dismissing Mickelsen Construction's 
Complaint because it is still entitled to litigate whether it can enforce the negotiable instrument (the 
Check) against Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial argue that the Complaint did not place it on notice that 
Mickelsen Construction was trying to collect the check. Mickelsen Construction disagrees. In 
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addition to pleading a guaranty transaction in paragraphs VI and VII, Mickelsen Construction alleged 
the following in its Complaint: 
VIII. 
The check written by LisaD. Horrocks on the account of Sunshine Secretarial 
Services, Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks bOlL.'1ced and despite numerous demands the 
checking account on which the check was written never had sufficient funds for the 
check. Copies ofletters from Idaho Central Credit Union dated January 26, 2009 and 
January 27,2009 are attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
IX. 
That the sum owed is a liquidated sum and plaintiff is entitled to interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum from and after January 8, 2009, and until a Judgment is 
entered in this matter. 
X. 
This is a matter which pursuantto Idaho Code 12-120, the Plaintiffis entitled 
to reasonable attorney fees for pursing this action. In the event of default a 
reasonable attorney fee is $2,500.00 together with Court costs incurred. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. For the sum of $34,980.00 against Lesa D. Horrocks and Sunshine 
Secretarial Services, Inc., jointly and severally. 
2. For interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after January 8, 
2009, and until a Judgment is entered in this matter. 
3. For a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of$2,500.00 in the event 
of default and if the matter is contested attorney fees be awarded based on a hourly 
rate of $200.00 per hour; 
R, pp. 2 - 3 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that a party may make two or more statements 
of claim in its pleadings: 
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts 
or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of 
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient 
by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also 
state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency 
and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall 
be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
IRCP Rule 8( e)(2) 
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According to IRCP Rule 8( a) (1 ) all that is required in addition to a jurisdictional allegation 
is "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and "a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." In Bakker v. Thunder 
Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 192 (2005) the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Idaho has adopted a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 
Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 864 (2000) (citation omitted); I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Thus, a 
pleading "which sets forth a claim for relief ... need only contain fa short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in addition to 
alleging jurisdiction of the court and a demand for judgment .... " Id. (citations 
omitted). Under notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating 
particular theories in its pleadings." Id. (quoting Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 
230,697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985), later proceeding, 112 Idaho 594, 733 P.2d 815 
(Ct. App. 1987)). Rather, a complaint need only state claims upon which relief may 
be granted. Id.; LR.C.P. 8(a)(1). All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. LR.C.P. 8(t). 
A fair reading of the Complaint in this case shows that it adequately plead entitlement to 
collect on the Check. The criticism by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial that a claim based on a 
guaranty agreement is inconsistent with a claim to enforce a negotiable instrument is not well 
founded. (Respondent's Brief, p. 12) IRCP Rule 8(e)(2) protects a party's right to "state as many 
separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency." (Emphasis supplied) The 
arguments by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial that Reed would prevent enforcement of the Check as 
a negotiable instrument is likewise not well founded. Reed did not involve a negotiable instrument 
and never addressed whether a check given in the circumstances ofthis case can be independently 
enforced. 
Mickelsen Construction is not seeking a detelmination from this Court as to whether it can 
recover on the theory of negotiable instrument. That was not the issue below and was not addressed 
by the trial court. However, it does believe that it adequately plead that it was attempting to collect 
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the amount of the check either as a guaranty or as a check and that summary judgment on the 
guaranty theory should not foreclose it from collecting the amount of the check from 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. The issue remains to be litigated. The trial court prematurely 
entered a final judgment precluding Mickelsen Construction from attempting to collect the amount 
ofthe check. Regardless how the 1. C. §§9-505 and 506 issues are resolved, the judgment should 
be set aside and Mickelsen Construction should be entitled to pursue recovery of the amount of the 
check. 
CONCLUSION 
Mickelsen Construction submits that the district court's award of summary judgment to 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial should be reversed, the judgment dismissing the Complaint should 
be set aside, the order and judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to Horrocks/Sunshine 
Secretarial should be reversed and set aside, and the case should be remanded for a determination 
whether Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial is an original obligor, guarantor and/or liable to Mickelsen 
Construction on the negotiable instrument. 
DATED this I / ~y of October, 2011. 
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